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The purpose of the present article is to highlight limitations of Lange and Eggert’s (2014) 24 
methodology of using identical self-control tasks in testing effects of glucose on depletion of 25 
self-control resources and self-control performance. We suggest that when participants 26 
engage in two identical self-control tasks, cognitions developed during initial act of self-27 
control may mask the effects of glucose on self-control performance by undermining 28 
willingness to exert effort during the second act of self-control. As a consequence, glucose 29 
may increase ability to exercise self-control but participants may not want to capitalize on 30 
this “ability advantage” because they are unwilling to exercise self-control. The present 31 
article concludes that researchers who test the glucose hypothesis in the context of a depletion 32 
paradigm should employ dissimilar acts of self-control and ensure that depleted participants 33 
are sufficiently motivated to exercise self-control. 34 
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Illusionary Delusions: Willingness to Exercise Self-Control Can Mask Effects of Glucose on 38 
Self Control Performance in Experimental Paradigms that Use Identical Acts of Self-Control  39 
Self-control is the capacity to supress thoughts, inhibit impulses, overcome 40 
temptations or change habits. Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven and Tice (1998) proposed 41 
the ‘strength’ or ‘limited resource’ model of self-control in which self-control is 42 
conceptualized as a limited resource. A large number of laboratory studies (N > 200) have 43 
supported this hypothesis by demonstrating that participants whose self-control resources 44 
have been depleted by an initial act of self-control performed worse on a second act of self-45 
control relative to participants whose self-control resources were not depleted by an initial act 46 
of self-control (Hagger et al., 2010). Tests of the model have typically adopted a dual-task 47 
paradigm in which participants engage in two consecutive tasks with an experimental group 48 
of participants receiving an initial (first) task that requires self-control while a control group 49 
receives a task that does not require self-control. Both groups then receive a second task 50 
requiring self-control exertion. Performance at the second act of self-control constitutes the 51 
dependent measure of self-control capacity. Critically, the two tasks are from different 52 
‘domains’ of self-control consistent with the need to test a key property of self-control from 53 
the perspective of the strength model: that it is a generalised, universal resource that applies 54 
to multiple domains of self-control (Baumeister et al., 1998; Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & 55 
Chatzisarantis, 2010). 56 
One important question related to the strength or limited resource model concerns the 57 
nature of the energy resource. Several researchers have proposed that glucose in the brain is 58 
the resource that supports self-control operations because mental effort, that is expended on a 59 
moment-by-moment basis during self-control operations, relies on adequate supply and 60 
availability of glucose in the brain (DeWall, Baumeister, Gailliot, & Maner, 2008; Gailliot et 61 
al., 2007). Consistent with this hypothesis, initial tests showed that engaging in self-control 62 
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tasks coincided with reductions in blood glucose levels and that ingesting a glucose solution 63 
improved self-control performance among participants whose self-control resources have 64 
been depleted by a previous act of self-control (Gailiot et al., 2007; Masicampo & 65 
Baumeister, 2008; Wang and Dvorak, 2010). However, the glucose results were criticised for 66 
a number of reasons: glucose levels in the brain do not correlate well with blood glucose, the 67 
demand of self-control tasks on brain glucose is relatively modest, and brain glucose levels 68 
remain relatively stable (Beedie & Lane, 2011; Kurzban, 2010). In addition, there is evidence 69 
that the effect of ingesting glucose on self-control is statistically incredible. Schimmack 70 
(2012) pointed out that the probability of failing to obtain the pattern of results reported by 71 
Galliot et al. (2007) in a replication was greater than 99%. An alternative perspective has 72 
been promulgated by researchers who have demonstrated that the effects of glucose on self-73 
control may be perceptual. Experiments demonstrated that rinsing the oral cavity with a 74 
glucose solution moderated the ego-depletion effect (Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 2013; Molden 75 
et al., 2012; Sanders et al., 2012). Hagger & Chatzisarantis (2013) argued that the effects 76 
were due to carbohydrate-sensitive receptor cells in the oral cavity sending afferent signals to 77 
the regions of the brain associated with motivation and the need for cognitive control, two 78 
areas likely to be implicated in successful self-control. 79 
Recently, Lange and Eggert (2014) attempted to replicate glucose effects, both 80 
ingestion and rinsing, without success. In addition, using Schimmack’s (2012) incredibility 81 
index, Lange and Eggert (2014) suggested that Hagger and Chatzisarantis’ (2013) glucose 82 
rinsing findings may be due to ‘luck’ or selective reporting of positive results. Lange and 83 
Eggert (2014) also questioned the validity of the glucose model of self-control on the basis 84 
that there is strong evidence that contradicts this belief. The aim of the present article is to 85 




A possible mechanism by which glucose increases ability for self-control is through 88 
activating brain regions that support self-control operations. However, glucose is only likely 89 
to improve self-control performance if people exert effort on a moment-to-moment basis, 90 
during self-control tasks. If individuals are unwilling to exercise self-control consistently 91 
when performing the task, then insufficient motivation may mask glucose effects – thus 92 
creating to experimenters the “illusion” that glucose does not influence self-control 93 
performance. Glucose may, therefore, increase an individuals’ capacity to exercise self-94 
control but this ‘glucose advantage’ may not be manifested in the results of empirical studies 95 
if depleted participants, who ingest or rinse their mouths with glucose, do not use this 96 
advantage because they are unwilling to exercise self-control.  97 
The dual-task paradigm used to detect depletion requires that participants engage in 98 
two acts that belong to different spheres of self-control (Baumeister et al., 1998). For 99 
example, if the initial act of self-control involves thought control (trying to not think of a 100 
target word) the second act may involve impulse control (trying to not eat a delicious snack). 101 
Other than permitting researchers to test whether different acts of self-control consume 102 
energy from a common resource, this paradigm also allows researchers to eliminate the 103 
impact of cognitions or affective experiences, that develop during initial exposure to self-104 
control tasks (i.e., boredom, low levels of self-efficacy), in affecting willingness to exert 105 
effort on the second self-control task (Fischer, Greitemeyer, & Frey, 2007; Wallace & 106 
Baumeister, 2002).  107 
Considering the design features of this paradigm, Lange and Eggert’s (2014) 108 
experiment exposed participants to the same act of self-control twice. As a consequence, their 109 
design failed to control for the impact of cognitions or affective experiences that develop 110 
during self-control operations, on willingness to exercise self-control. This methodology 111 
might have ‘masked’ the proposed glucose effects in their studies for a number of reasons. 112 
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The reasons include (i) development of response strategies that diminish the need to rely on 113 
self-control resources and, as a result, the need for glucose (Study 1); (ii) enhanced levels of 114 
boredom that participants might have experienced as a result of engaging in the same self-115 
control task twice (Study 1); and (iii) low levels of optimism and self-efficacy that might 116 
have been developed as a result of receiving negative feedback (Study 2). These factors may 117 
have introduced confounds which masked the glucose effect on self-control in their 118 
experiments. Importantly, the experiments are inconsistent with the widely-used dual-task 119 
paradigm rife in the depletion literature. For their study to make a viable and robust test of the 120 
glucose effect, a high-powered, precise replication of an experiment using two separate tasks 121 
that have been previously adopted in the depletion literature seems to be the minimum 122 
criterion. 123 
In addition, in Study 2, the task that Lange and Eggert (2014) used to induce depletion 124 
and measure self-control performance provided participants with negative feedback. 125 
However, negative feedback reduces effort by undermining confidence in ability to control 126 
task demands (Bandura, 1977). For example, negative feedback received during the first act 127 
of self-control might have undermined willingness to subsequently exercise self-control for 128 
the second act by undermining self-efficacy beliefs. It is important to note that negative 129 
feedback might have undermined willingness to exercise self-control by altering the 130 
subjective value of the self-control task (Muraven & Slessareva, 2003) and not necessarily by 131 
changing expectations related to whether or not people believe that self-control capacity is a 132 
limited (versus unlimited) resource (Job, Dweck, & Walton, 2010; Job Walton, Bernederk, & 133 
Dweck, 2013). This alternative hypothesis is plausible because cognitions and self-efficacy 134 
beliefs are more likely to generalise across similar than dissimilar tasks (Hattie & Timperley, 135 
2007). Interestingly, Fischer, Greitemayer, and Frey (2007) showed that depleted participants 136 
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reported lower levels of self-efficacy than non-depleted participants even when participants 137 
engaged in tasks that did not provide direct feedback.  138 
Moreover, Lange and Eggert’s (2014) findings in Study 1 were inconsistent with 139 
Wang and Dvorak’s (2010) study concerning the effects of glucose ingestion on ego-140 
depletion. However, there was one notable difference between these two studies that is worth 141 
mentioning because it often goes unnoticed in the ego-depletion literature. Specifically, both 142 
Lange and Eggert (2014) and Wang and Dvorak (2010) used a decision task which forced 143 
participants to choose between a large delayed reward or a smaller immediate reward. 144 
However, Wang and Dvorak’s (2010) participants were presented with rewards. This 145 
procedure facilitates a real “acquisition experience” which is ego-depleting (Hsee, Yang, Li, 146 
& Shen, 2009). That is, in Wang and Dvorak’s experiment the decision to discount monetary 147 
rewards was consequential as participants expected to receive a reward. In contrast, in Lange 148 
and Eggert’s (Study 1) participants hypothetically chose between a large delayed reward and 149 
a smaller immediate reward. Hence, participants’ decision to choose a delayed reward was 150 
less consequential (if at all) and hence ego depleting (see also Lange et al., 2014). 151 
Unfortunately, Lange and Eggert (2014) did not include a control group to examine whether 152 
their tasks were ego-depleting. This distinction between hypothetical decisions and real 153 
decisions is equivalent to Kahneman’s (1994) distinction between experienced utility and 154 
predicted utility and consistent with studies showing substantive inconsistencies between 155 
predicted experiences and real experiences (Hsee, Yang, Li, & Shen, 2008). 156 
Lange and Eggert (2014) also criticised Hagger and Chatzisarantis’s (2013) findings 157 
on the basis of an ‘incredibility index’ analysis that contrasts number of statistically 158 
significant findings in reported studies against total power of the reported studies. Their 159 
analysis showed that the probability of not obtaining a pattern of results as reported by 160 
Hagger and Chatzisarantis (2013) was 98%. However, Lange and Eggert (2014) used a 161 
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weighted average effect size (meta-analytic effect size; Hagger et al., 2010) to calculate the 162 
incredibility index. They omitted to report incredibility indexes that were calculated on the 163 
basis of observed or averaged effect sizes (see Schimmack, 2012). We re-ran the incredibility 164 
index analysis using the observed and averaged effect sizes from the individual studies in 165 
Hagger and Chatzisarantis’ (2013) article and found the incredibility index to be as low as 166 
78% (see Table 1). The reason for this difference is that the average power of studies that is 167 
calculated on the basis of individual effect sizes or averaged effect size is larger than the 168 
average power that is calculated on the basis of the weighted average effect size. These 169 
incredibility indexes are lower than those reported by Lange and Eggert (2014) and suggest 170 
that their dismissal of glucose effects on self-control performance is an overstatement. 171 
In addition, a more relevant analysis would be to analyze the data to evaluate whether 172 
the effects were due to a ‘small study’ bias, which reflects the tendency for smaller studies to 173 
report larger effect sizes. One possible reason for the ‘small study effects’ may be publication 174 
bias, that is, the tendency for journals to favour and publish small, statistically significant but 175 
likely underpowered studies (see Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 2014). As Lange and Eggert 176 
(2014) claim that the glucose effect on depletion may be biased upward and the chances of 177 
finding so many significant effects improbable, it would make sense to test our analysis 178 
against this claim. We therefore applied two techniques based on funnel plots i.e. plotting the 179 
effect size against study precision: Egger and Sterne’s (2005) regression technique and Duval 180 
and Tweedie’s (2000) trim and fill. Egger and Sterne’s regression analysis indicated little 181 
evidence of bias with a non-significant regression slope and Duval and Tweedie’s trim and 182 
fill identified no ‘missing’ studies from the funnel plot. Both the analyses provide some 183 
evidence that the sample was not affected by bias. However, we must reiterate our claim in 184 
the meta-analysis that this is a very small sample of studies and that the tests alone do not 185 
provide definitive evidence for the presence or absence of bias. These caveats 186 
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notwithstanding, these analyses do not support the claim that the effect of glucose 187 
supplementation on self-control is overestimated. 188 
Despite the limitations we have outlined, we still think that Lange and Eggert’s (2014) 189 
studies have made an important contribution to the literature. Their findings indicate that the 190 
methodology of using the same self-control task twice should be interpreted with caution 191 
when researchers test the ego-depletion effect and the glucose hypothesis. Although there are 192 
published studies that used the same self-control task (see Hagger et al., 2010), we think that 193 
researchers should use different tasks when testing novel hypothesis. To conclude that 194 
glucose drinks fail to counteract depletion of self-control resources, one has to make sure that 195 
depleted participants are sufficiently motivated to tap on self-control resources and hence 196 
capitalize on the glucose advantage. Unfortunately, the methodology of using identical tasks 197 
does not guarantee that depleted participants are sufficiently motivated to exercise self-198 
control. Hence, Lange and Eggert’s (2014) conclusion that the ‘glucose effect’ is delusionary 199 
is an overstatement because they adopted an experimental paradigm does not produce strong 200 
evidence that contradicts this belief. Our suggestion is that researchers who test the glucose 201 
hypothesis should employ dissimilar acts of self-control and make sure that depleted 202 
participants are sufficiently motivated to exercise self-control (Baumeister et al., 1998). 203 
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Table 1. Incredibility index analysis for Hagger et al.’s (2012) experiments 280 
    Power 
Study  N d Sig WAVG Individual AVG 
1 27 1.19 
Means, d 
= .88 




1 .47 .84 .75 
2 32 .91 Means 
d = 0.87 
F-ratio, d 
= .87 V. 
CLOSE 
1 .54 .70 .82 
3 34 .70 Means 
= 0.69 F-
ratio, d = 
.69 V. 
CLOSE 
1 .56 .51 .84 
4 23 1.67 
Means, d 
= 0.71, F-




1 .40 .97 .67 
5 20 .77 
Means, d 
= .79, F-
ratio, d = 
.71 V. 
CLOSE 
1 .36 .37 .60 
Average 27.2 1.05 1 .47 .68 .78 
Total power    .02 .15 .22 
IC-index    .98 .85 .78 
Note. d = individual effect sizes. WAVG = power calculated on the basis of weight average 281 
effect size (d = .75). Individual = power calculate on the basis of individual effect sizes. AVG 282 
= power calculated on the basis of average effect size (d = 1.05) 283 
 284 
 285 
